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April 12, 2005
St. Paul, Minn. —
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A04-1302
Unity Church of St. Paul, et al.,
Respondents,
Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al.,
Respondents,
City of Minneapolis,
Respondent,
People Serving People, Inc., et al.,
Respondents,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Appellant.
Filed April 12, 2005
Affirmed
Randall, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. C9-03-9570
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Solicitor General, Thomas R. Ragatz,
Ann K. Bloodhart, Assistants Attorneys General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota
Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)
Marshall H. Tanick, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., 1700 Pillsbury Center South, 220 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-4511 (for respondents Unity Church of St. Paul, et al.)
David Lillehaug, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., 4000 Pillsbury Center, 200 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-1425 (for respondents Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al.)
Peter Ginder, Acting Deputy Minneapolis City Attorney, Burt T. Osborne, Assistant City Attorney, 333 South Seventh Street, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55402-2453 (for respondent City of Minneapolis)
John B. Gordon, Faegre & Benson LLP, 2200 Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and
Joseph W. Hammell, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and
James P. McCarthy, Lindquist & Vennum PLLP, 4200 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondents People Serving People, et al.)
Joseph E. Olson, David M. Gross, Gun Owners Civil Rights Alliance, 8323 West Franklin Avenue, St. Louis Park, MN 55426-1914 (for amicus curiae)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Minge, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
I. 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, containing the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003, an amendment relating to firearm possession for certain criminal offenders, and various natural resources amendments, violates the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. Its three disparate provisions are not germane to a single subject.
II. Severance of the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003
from chapter 28 is the appropriate remedy where the act is the portion of chapter
28 being challenged and the act is not germane to the law’s remaining
provisions.
O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
This lawsuit involves respondent religious and charitable organizations’
constitutional challenge to the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection
Act of 2003 (PPA). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor
of respondents, holding that 2003 Minn. Laws. ch. 28 violated the single-subject
requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. The district court remedied
the violation by severing the PPA from the rest of chapter 28.
Appellant argues that (1) 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 does not violate the single-subject
requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17 and (2) the PPA does not violate
the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution as applied to
respondents.
We conclude the district court properly found that chapter 28 violates the single-subject
requirement of the Minnesota Constitution. Then, the district court properly
severed the disparate portion of the bill (the PPA) from the remainder of chapter
28. Since we affirm the district court on the single-subject issue, we decline
to address appellant’s Freedom of Conscience clause argument on an advisory
basis.
FACTS
The history of the PPA is an integral part of the parties’ legal arguments.
On January 30, 2003, Representative Lynda Boudreau introduced the PPA as H.F.
261. State of Minnesota, Journal of the House, Eighty-Third Session 174 (Jan.
30, 2003). H.F. 261 was titled in part, “a bill for an act relating to
public safety: enacting the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act
of 2003; . . . .” Id. The bill proposed a “must issue” system
for issuing permits to carry handguns in public places, mandating statewide
uniformity for handgun permitting and requiring sheriffs to grant handgun permits
to anyone who meets specified criteria. H.F. 261, third engrossment. The bill
also curtailed the ability of private establishments to ban firearms and proposed
specific rules that private establishments must follow to ban firearms within
set limits. Id. H.F. 261 further proposed amendments to the criminal law, creating
new firearm crimes and modifying existing crimes. Id.
H.F. 261 passed through the House Civil Law Committee, the House Committee on
Judiciary Policy and Finance, and the House Committee on Ways and Means, with
the recommendation that it pass as amended. State of Minnesota, Journal of the
House, Eighty-Third Session 242, 350, 1240 (Feb. 13, 2003, Feb. 27, 2003, Apr.
7, 2003). On April 23, 2003, H.F. 261 was placed on the House’s calendar
for consideration. Id. at 2643.
Meanwhile, S.F. 842 was introduced in the Senate on March 13, 2003 as a “bill
for an act relating to natural resources.” State of Minnesota, Journal
of the Senate, Eighty-Third Session 337 (Mar. 13, 2003). S.F. 842 contained
several statutory amendments relating to (1) natural resource grants; (2) gifts
or grants of land to the state;
(3) snowmobile registration applications; (4) snowmobile safety course reciprocity;
(5) watercraft licensing; (6) game and fish fines; (7) fish house identification;
(8) fish house license display; and (9) the state parks’ working capital
fund. After proceeding through the Senate Environment and Natural Resources
Committee, S.F. 842 passed the Senate on March 24, 2003 by a vote of 65-0 and
was sent to the House for consideration. State of Minnesota, Journal of the
Senate, Eighty-Third Session 426 (Mar. 24, 2003). The House Committee on Environment
and Natural Resources Finance amended S.F. 842 to (1) rescind the need for legislative
approval for state park fees and (2) make adjustments to laws regulating and
punishing littering within outdoor recreation systems and on highways. Hearing
on S.F. 842 before the House Comm. on Env’t and Natural Res. (Apr. 11,
2003).
On April 23, 2003, the same day the PPA was to be considered, S.F. 842 was brought
to the House floor. State of Minnesota, Journal of the House, Eighty-Third Session
2644 (Apr. 23, 2003). Several representatives referred to S.F. 842 as a “DNR
technical bill.” House Floor Debate on S.F. No. 842 (Apr. 23, 2003) (statements
of Rep. Cornish, Rep. Kelliher, Rep. Paulsen, Rep. Entenza). Representative
Cornish offered an amendment to the bill, authorizing the DNR commissioner to
recognize out-of-state safety courses for motorcycles, ATVs, and watercraft
and adding a clause to the statutory provision requiring a firearms safety certificate
to obtain a hunting license. Id.; State of Minnesota, Journal of the House,
Eighty-Third Session 2644 (Apr. 23, 2003). The amendment passed.
Representative Boudreau then moved to amend S.F. 842 to include H.F. 261, the
PPA, and to divide the PPA and DNR bill into 2 separate articles. House Floor
Debate on S.F. No. 842 (Apr. 23, 2003). Before voting on this motion, Representative
Lynn Osterman moved to amend H.F. 261 to include “Article 3,” a
lifetime ban on firearm possession for violent felons. State of Minnesota, Journal
of the House, Eighty-Third Session 2660 (Apr. 23, 2003).
The House passed Osterman’s amendment by a vote of 112 to 18. Id. at 2666.
The House next passed Boudreau’s amendment to S.F. 842, which now included
both the PPA and the ban on firearm possession for violent felons, by a vote
of 88 to 46. Id. at 2678. Following these amendments, the House passed S.F.
842, containing both the original DNR provisions and the new firearm legislation,
by the same margin and returned the bill to the Senate on April 28, 2003. Id.
at 2679. S.F. 842 was still titled “an act relating to natural resources.”
State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, Eighty-Third Session 1389 (Apr. 28,
2003).
Once in the Senate, Senator Olson moved that the Senate concur in the House
amendments and re-pass S.F. 842. Id. After seven hours of debate, the Senate
re-passed S.F. 842 as amended by the House by a vote of 37 to 30. Senate Floor
Debate on S.F. No. 842 (Apr. 28, 2003). Governor Tim Pawlenty signed S.F. 842
into law the evening of April 28, 2003. State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate,
Eighty-Third Session 1534 (Apr. 29, 2003). When signed into law, S.F. 842 was
divided into three articles. The PPA is Article 2. Article 1 relates to natural
resources, and Article 3 relates to violent felons in possession of firearms.
Soon thereafter, respondents Unity Church of St. Paul d/b/a Unity Church Unitarian
and White Bear Unitarian Universalist Church filed a complaint in Ramsey County
District Court challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the PPA, arguing
that the act violates the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
Minn. Const. Art. I, § 16. Over the next several months, three groups of
intervenors joined the lawsuit, known during the litigation as “Religious
Organizations,” the City of Minneapolis, and “Charitable Agencies.”
The intervening respondents raised additional
constitutional challenges to the PPA, including the claim that the PPA violates
the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. The original
plaintiffs then amended their complaint to conform to the Religious Organizations’
complaint.
Respondents filed motions for partial summary judgment on several different
grounds, some raising Freedom of Conscience clause challenges, and others making
“takings” (improper use of eminent domain–no compensation)
arguments. But all respondents singularly argued that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28
violated the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17.
Appellant State of Minnesota moved the district court to dismiss the action.
Instead, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents,
concluding that “the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act
200[3], known as Senate File 842, violates Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota
Constitution because it embraces more than one subject.” The district
court severed the PPA from the rest of 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, leaving the DNR-amendments
bill as law.
The district court did not rule on respondents’ other arguments, namely
whether the PPA violates the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
and whether the PPA constitutes a property taking without compensation in violation
of the state and federal constitutions. The district court “[made] comment
regarding both issues to provide guidance to the Appellate Courts.” This
appeal followed.
ISSUES
I. Does 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violate the single-subject requirement of Minn.
Const. Art. IV, § 17?
II. Does the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003 violate
the Freedom of Conscience clause of Minn. Const. Art. I, § 16?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment, we must determine whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application
of the law. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 1999). Where there
are no material facts in dispute, our review is limited to determining whether
the district court correctly applied the law. Associated Builders & Contractors
v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Minn. 2000).
The constitutionality of a statute presents such a question of law, which we
review de novo. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. 1997). Minnesota statutes
are presumed constitutional, and, therefore, this court exercises its power
to declare a statute unconstitutional “with extreme caution and only when
absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989).
A party challenging a statute carries the heavy burden of demonstrating beyond
a reasonable doubt that a statute is unconstitutional. Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 566.
I.
Minnesota Constitution, Article IV, Section 17 – Single-Subject Requirement
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that 2003 Minn.
Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement of the Minnesota Constitution.
First, and importantly to the parties, in reviewing the district court’s
findings, we are not reviewing the merits of the PPA. We are simply reviewing
the district court’s determination that the subject matter of the various
provisions contained in 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 was not germane to a single subject.
This case does not address the merits of the PPA and constitutes no comment
on the public policy underlying the act itself (other than to reiterate that
the public policy of “single-subject germaneness” has been embedded
in the Minnesota Constitution since passage in 1857.)
To ensure that all readers of this opinion, legal and lay persons, have a common
language, we have a commentary. The PPA has been widely known, debated, and
discussed, under a nickname—the “conceal and carry” bill.
Somehow, the nickname “conceal and carry” got on the bill and stuck
like a porcupine’s quills in the nose of an overaggressive hunting dog.
To set the record straight, both sides agree there is not now, nor has there
ever been, any “conceal” in the laws surrounding the regulation
and application for a permit to carry a handgun on one’s person. “Conceal”
has never been a part of the PPA. The PPA allows you, if you have the permit,
to carry the handgun openly or to have it beneath some article of clothing where
it does not show. If you do not get the permit, it does not matter whether you
wish to carry the handgun outside or inside your clothing. You cannot do it
without being criminally liable. 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, art. 2, § 4. The
same thing is true of the former handgun permit law, which the PPA supplanted.
Under the prior law, in effect since the start of Minnesota’s handgun
permitting laws (1975 Minn. Laws ch. 378 § 4, codified at Minn. Stat. §
624.714 (1976)), if you had a permit to carry a handgun, it did not matter whether
you displayed it openly or concealed it. If you did not have a permit under
the prior law to carry a handgun, it would also not matter whether you displayed
it openly or concealed it. You could not. Thus, a more accurate short-term handle
for the PPA at issue would be the “handgun carry” bill, nothing
more.
In discussing the district court’s ruling, both sides agree the starting
point is the constitutional provision. Article 4, section 17, requires that
“[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title.” Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. We confine our analysis
to the “single-subject requirement” since respondents did not claim
a violation of the “title requirement” of Minn. Const. Art. IV,
§ 17.
The purpose of the single-subject requirement is to prevent “log rolling
legislation” or “omnibus bills” in which dissimilar subjects
are united in one bill and carried through by a combination of interests. Associated
Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577,
50 N.W. 923, 924 (1891)). In other words, this provision ensures that each piece
of legislation receives separate and individual consideration on the merits
by prohibiting the insertion of wholly unrelated matters. Defenders of Wildlife
v. Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct.
24, 2001). The single-subject provision is not intended to preclude the enactment
of comprehensive legislation addressing related topics within a general subject
area. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. County of Hennepin, 478 N.W.2d
487, 490 (Minn. 1991).
While the single-subject provision is mandatory, “the single subject
provision should be interpreted liberally and the restriction [will] be met
if the bill [is] germane to one general subject . . . ‘it is to be given
a liberal, and not a strict, construction.’” Associated Builders,
610 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Johnson, 47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W.2d at 924) (emphasis
added); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 711. This judicial approach
affords the appropriate and needed deference to the Minnesota legislature. Because
of this high degree of deference given to the legislature to perform its constitutional
role, there is an historical scarcity of attacks on legislation on single-subject
grounds (approximately 60 in the past 148 years), and an even scarcer number
of successful attacks. See generally Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 300-02
(outlining history of constitutional attacks to legislation under the single-subject
requirement). We were able to identify only five in the last 148 years. In sum,
the single-subject provision has historically been given a liberal construction
to benefit the legislature.
At the oral argument on this case, appellant referred, at times, to not wanting
“liberal” or “activist” judges to overstep the will
of the Minnesota legislature. Simply put, the term “liberal/activist judge”
is, in reality, a “non-term.” Both parties to this debate recognize
the truth. What one calls “a well-reasoned conservative judicial opinion
by a son or daughter of the founding fathers” means only that the judge
ruled in your favor! When the judge rules against you and in favor of your opponent,
on the identical facts and argument, you will now turn to the banal cliché
that the judge “is too activist” for me. The term is meaningless,
self-defeating, and, worse, it actually weakens appellant’s position.
What appellant is arguing for is a broad, liberal, and expansive interpretation
of Article IV, Section 17, which the judiciary has traditionally applied to
the all-encompassing bills of the legislature. If the judiciary were to take
a strict, narrow, conservative approach to the constitutional mandate that “no
law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title,”
virtually every appropriations bill, every omnibus bill, every technical cleanup
bill, and every other type of multi-act legislation that the legislature routinely
deals out, without even thinking about it, would be subject to Article IV scrutiny,
and many would fail. The last thing appellant wants here is a strict, narrow,
conservative approach to the meaning of some pretty plain English—no law
shall embrace more than one subject.
Thus, we follow the traditional broad, liberal, and expansive interpretive
rule set out in Associated Builders. The Minnesota legislature wants the judiciary
to refrain from taking a strict constructionist approach to single-subject-provision
jurisprudence. That has been the experience of the Minnesota judiciary.
A. Germaneness
Keeping these overarching considerations in mind, a reviewing court applies
a germaneness analysis to determine whether a law violates the single-subject
requirement of article 4, section 17. Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 302-03;
Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg’l Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Minn.
1989). This means that the single-subject requirement will be met as long as
all matters in the bill are “germane to” one general subject, meaning
that “all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea,
be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular
understanding, as to be parts of . . . one general subject.” Associated
Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 300 (quoting Johnson, 47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W. at 924).
The term “general subject” should be given a broad and extended
meaning. Id. at 300-01.
To be germane to a single subject, the various sections of the bill need only
be connected by a “mere filament” to one another and to the general
subject. See Blanch, 449 N.W.2d at 154-55 (holding park bill was “germane”
to the broad subject of
appropriations for state government operation even though the common thread
running through the sections was a “mere filament”). In other words,
the connection between several matters to render them germane to one subject
and to each other, “can be of various kinds, as, for example, of means
to ends . . . or that all are designed for the same purpose, or that both are
designated by the same term.” Johnson, 47 Minn. at 578, 50 N.W. at 924.
Subjects will be considered impermissibly duplicitous if the subjects lack any
“legitimate connection with or relation to each other.” Id. at 577,
50 N.W. at 924. In other words, provisions are not germane if they pertain to
wholly unrelated matters. State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. at 312, 322 (1875).
As noted, because of the liberal deference given to the legislature, Minnesota
courts have rarely invalidated laws for a lack of germaneness. Defenders of
Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 712. For instance, a constitutional amendment levying
taxes on motor vehicle fuel and issuing bonds to finance highway construction
was found germane to the subject of transportation where every matter in the
chapter concerned the use, financing, and construction of a public highway transportation
system and there was no evidence of fraud. Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 394,
399-400, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135-36 (1977). A provision exempting space in the Metrodome
from property taxation was held germane to the subject of taxation present in
the title of a large fiscal omnibus bill. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n,
478 N.W.2d at 490. A law providing for wolf management was related to other
parts of the bill including fish and wildlife management, hunting and fishing
licenses, and revenue raised for the game and fish fund—all related to
the general subject of natural resources. Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d
at 713; see also Masters v. Comm’r, Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
604 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding the areas of environment, natural
resources, and agriculture constitute one subject). Confirming that subjects
are to be construed broadly, a law authorizing a park district to acquire land,
designed to make possible the utilization of funds previously appropriated,
was germane to the subject of “appropriations for the operation of state
government.” Blanch, 449 N.W.2d at 155. The common thread running through
the various sections of the bill, appropriations for a wide range of state agencies,
was “indeed a mere filament.” Id.; see also 1998 Minn. Laws ch.
686, art. 1.
However, having set out the historic liberal interpretation of Article IV,
Section 17, we note that the Minnesota Supreme Court recently sounded an alarm
to the Minnesota legislature that the judiciary will strike down oversweeping
legislation. The Minnesota Supreme Court drew the line in Associated Builders,
holding that an amendment requiring prevailing wages in school construction
and remodeling regardless of whether the project was publicly funded was not
related—not even by a “mere filament”—to an omnibus
tax relief and reform bill governing the financing and operation of state government.
610 N.W.2d at 303. The Associated Builders court expressed its frustration with
“garbage” or omnibus bills encompassing many unrelated
subjects. Id. Associated Builders held that any bill containing vastly dissimilar
provisions such as “provisions relating to agricultural land, a council
of Asian Pacific Minnesotans and the establishment of a recycling program”
must be struck down. Id. at 301 (citing State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski,
391 N.W.2d 777, 784 (Minn. 1986) (Yetka, J., concurring specially)).
In the case of the PPA, the district court found ascertaining a single subject
in chapter 28 to be an impossible task. The district court explained,
It is clear that [the Personal Protection Act], which regulates firearms, contains a totally different subject matter from the regulatory provision and from the Department of Natural Resources found in Minnesota Statute 84.01, et. al. This law is unconstitutional because it clearly violates not only the intent, but also the clear meaning of Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution.
As the district court noted, article 2 of chapter 28, the PPA, plainly relates
to handgun permitting, regulating who may obtain a permit and how those permits
must be issued. Other portions of article 2 create new firearm crimes, modify
existing crimes, and recognize the right of law-abiding citizens to self-protection
through the lawful use of self-defense. The PPA also sets limits on the ability
of private establishments to ban guns from their premises. Chapter 28, article
3, enacts a permanent ban on firearm possession for violent felons. Articles
2 and 3, taken together, are germane to one general subject—namely handgun
permitting and firearm regulation. On the other hand, the provisions in article
1 of chapter 28 do not relate to handgun permitting and firearm regulation.
Article 1 contains an array of “boilerplate” DNR-related amendments
addressing (1) legislative approval of state park fees; (2) the commissioner’s
authority to enter into grant agreements; (3) the commissioner’s authority
to accepts gifts on behalf of the state; (4) snowmobile registration; (5) interstate
reciprocity agreements for off-highway motorcycle, ATV, and watercraft safety
courses; (6) littering on a highway; (7) watercraft licensing applications;
(8) fines for violating game and fish laws; (9) fish house identification; (10)
fish house license display; (11) hunting licensing; and (12) the state parks’
working capital fund. Article 1 contains varied provisions, and giving these
provisions a common-sense interpretation, the DNR amendments (article 1) all
relate to the single subject of “natural resources” or “the
environment.” See Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 713; Masters, 604
N.W.2d at 138. It was apparent to the district court that the subjects “natural
resources” and “the environment” were not germane to mandatory
handgun permitting.
Viewing chapter 28 in its entirety, we affirm the district court’s conclusion
that the two disparate subjects contained within lack a legitimate connection
to one another. Thus, chapter 28 fails the germaneness analysis. See Johnson,
47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W. at 924. We are compelled to find that chapter 28, which
contains dissimilar provisions, must be declared unconstitutional in violation
of the single-subject requirement. See Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 301
(noting that, contrary to prior deferential decisions, any bill containing vastly
dissimilar provisions must be struck down).
The legislative history of S.F. 842 sheds light on the discrepancy between
article 1 (the DNR technical amendment bill) and articles 2 and 3 (handgun permitting
and firearm regulation) and supports the district court’s conclusion that
chapter 28 lacks one cohesive, single subject. See Defenders of Wildlife, 632
N.W.2d at 714 (acknowledging that legislative history may provide evidentiary
support of single-subject violations). Article 1—the original S.F. 842—was
titled in part, “an act relating to natural resources” and was known
to legislators as “a DNR technical bill.” Only when the House amended
S.F. 842 to include the PPA and provisions restricting a felon’s ability
to possess firearms, did the bill expand to encompass topics well outside of
“natural resources” and “the environment,” namely, handgun
permitting
But, appellant contends that because the PPA, in terms of size and exposure,
is distinguishable from the provision at issue in Associated Builders—the
recent case in which the supreme court found a violation of the single-subject
requirement—chapter 28 should be upheld. Appellant further notes that
the PPA, unlike the offending provision in Associated Builders, is not a tiny
section of an immense omnibus bill that passed through the legislature unnoticed.
Appellant contends out that the PPA, as amended to S.F. 842, received extensive
legislative attention in both the House and the Senate.
Appellant is correct that the House engaged in extensive debate before passing
S.F. 842. The Senate discussed the act for over seven hours before re-passing
the bill. That is all true, but the legislative exposure disparity between the
PPA and the provision at issue in Associated Builders is a distinction without
a difference. Yes, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed frustration with
“midnight-passed garbage” or omnibus bills because these types of
bills often run afoul of the single-subject requirement. But that cannot mean
that bills that receive more legislative attention and more column inches in
the newspaper will never violate the single-subject requirement. The proper
inquiry on a constitutional challenge under Minn. Const., art. IV, § 17
is whether the law is germane to a single subject, not whether a bill was hotly
debated or whether it passed through legislative committees unnoticed.
B. Logrolling and other Practical Considerations
Appellant also gives considerable weight in its brief to its claim that there
was no impermissible logrolling in the passage of S.F. 842. Appellant argues
that the mischief the single-subject requirement is intended to address is not
present. Appellant urges this court to consider this and related “practical
considerations,” to conclude that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 does not violate
the single-subject requirement. We are not persuaded.
The Associated Builders court addressed appellant’s precise argument and
determined that the contention was misdirected. 610 N.W.2d at 303 (addressing
whether the absence of impermissible logrolling preserved the law from constitutional
attack). Associated Builders clarified that “[t]he purpose of preventing
logrolling is to preclude unrelated subjects from appearing in a popular bill,
not to eliminate unpopular provisions in a bill that genuinely encompasses one
general subject.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the evil in bundling
disparate provisions in one law is not in putting unpopular germane provisions
with popular germane provisions. The evil in bundling disparate provisions in
one law is in putting popular and unpopular germane provisions with nongermane
provisions.
What the Minnesota Constitution requires is germaneness. It does not require
the absence of legislative maneuvering to enact unpopular, but germane, bills.
In fact, the legislature has a long tradition of such permissible maneuvering
since statehood. It is essential, to get any bills passed in a state that has
disparate concerns in different regions of the state, and disparate concerns
even within one region, that popular and less popular bills (germane) get lumped
together to attract the needed votes. The judiciary understands and appreciates
that.
Appellant also makes much of the extensive media attention shed on the PPA,
citing Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 714, and Lifteau v. Metro. Sports
Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn. 1978), for the proposition
that a provision in a bill that receives a large amount of media attention does
not offend the purpose behind the single-subject requirement. We note the Defenders
court only said the wolf management plan received considerable public and legislative
attention to rebut the argument that the provision was given little consideration.
632 N.W.2d at 714. Defenders did not hold that media attention was determinative
in considering whether the single-subject restriction was violated. Id. The
wolf management plan was held to be constitutional, not because it received
public attention, but because it was germane to “natural resources”—the
law’s general subject.
After closely examining the record, we hold the district court properly concluded
that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement of Minn.
Const. Art. IV, § 17 and is unconstitutional. Our affirmance of the district
court neither prejudges the merits of the PPA nor the public policy behind the
debate on the merits. Our holding does not prevent the Minnesota Legislature
from attempting to pass future “carry bills.”
This case is about performing the judiciary’s constitutional role of
upholding the Minnesota Constitution and giving effect to each of its provisions.
To date, the 148 years of Minnesota’s statehood have produced approximately
five successful attacks on legislation under the single-subject requirement
of the Minnesota Constitution. If the legislature deems it an impediment that
perhaps one bill gets shot down on an average of once every 20 or 30 years,
they, not the courts, hold the keys to amending the Minnesota Constitution and
repealing the single-subject requirement. The Minnesota legislature originally
passed Article IV, Section 17, and, to date, the legislature has not set the
wheels in motion to repeal it. The legislature writes the constitutional provisions.
The judiciary simply has an obligation to interpret them.
C. Severance
Having affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 2003 Minn. Laws ch.
28 violates the single-subject requirement, we next consider the district court’s
remedy. The district court severed the PPA from chapter 28, and let article
1, the DNR bill, stand. Both parties propose severing the “offending”
portions of chapter 28, but disagree on which parts to sever. Appellant argues
that the district court improperly severed the PPA from chapter 28 and requests
that this court instead sever the DNR amendments contained in article 1, leaving
articles 2 and 3 standing as the law. Respondent maintains that the district
court correctly severed the PPA because it was, without dispute, the “offending
amendment.” We agree with respondents. Appellant does not (and cannot)
disagree that the handgun carry portion of the bill, and the handgun carry portion
only, is the center of this debate. Appellant does not dispute that the DNR
technical amendments contained in article 1 are not offensive and are not the
subject of this “single-subject” lawsuit.
In remedying constitutional deficiencies, the judiciary should be hesitant to declare more of a law unconstitutional than absolutely necessary to avoid “overstepping our judicial bounds in disregard of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 305 (citing Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 1999)). The established rule is that: while a part of [a] statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 133, 75 N.W. 8, 9-10 (1898)).
In the single-subject context, the supreme court has expressly advised the
judiciary, if possible, to “[bring] the law into constitutional compliance
by severing a provision that is not germane to the theme of the law.”
Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 305. And where litigation challenges only
one aspect of a law, the judiciary should sever the provision being challenged
and decline to prejudge unchallenged portions of the law. Id. Importantly, Minnesota
courts have historically severed the challenged section, leaving the rest of
the law intact. See, e.g., Egekvist Bakeries, Inc. v. Benson, 186 Minn. 520,
523, 243 N.W. 853, 854 (1932); In re Day, 93 Minn. 178, 182, 102 N.W. 209, 211
(1904); Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 132-33, 84 N.W. 788, 790 (1901).
The Associated Builders court followed this 100-year line of historical cases
in deciding to sever an offending amendment while permitting the other provisions
of a session law to stand. 610 N.W.2d at 304-05.
We note that the severance remedy is not without criticism. Justice Anderson
in a concurring opinion in Associated Builders stated, “Severance of a
challenged provision of a law found to be in violation of Section 17 would defeat
Section 17’s purpose and establish the judiciary as a ‘super-legislature.’”
After acknowledging that reasoned argument, it is correct to say that, under
current law, it is preferable to sever the challenged “offending amendment”
rather than invalidate unchallenged provisions of the law or strike down the
entire session law. Associated Builders stands as a reminder that, when possible,
the judiciary should decide in favor of “a more pragmatic result that
is [still] consistent with our constitution” and avoid “the draconian
outcome of holding . . . that an unrelated provision in a law should bring the
whole law down.” Id. at 307.
Here, the district court took the pragmatic approach, severing the PPA from
chapter 28 and leaving the DNR bill as law. We agree that the PPA is plainly
the disputed amendment that was attached to the DNR technical bill to assist
the PPA’s passage through the Senate. The DNR technical provisions are
not being litigated. It would overstep our judicial function to sever portions
of article 1 for the purpose of upholding the PPA, where no party contested
the constitutionality of the DNR provisions. That step by us could only be seen
as a political commentary on the merits of the handgun carry bill. That is not
for us; it is for the legislature.
We note that because of the various amendments to S.F. 842, the bill, in its
final form (signed by the governor’s office), contained an article 2,
denoting the PPA, and an article 3, with article 3 covering the firearms regulation
provision as it applied to violent felons. Article 3 was not mentioned specifically
by the district court in its order. Regardless, we find no dispute over the
intent of the district court judge who signed the order now on appeal. The specific
intent in the court’s order and accompanying memorandum was to find “[t]hat
the [PPA] known as S.F. 842, violates Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota
Constitution,” the single-subject provision.
Neither the district court’s order nor its memorandum broke down the
PPA into article 2, handgun permitting, and article 3, violent felons in possession.
What is clear is the district court’s intent to sever the PPA, having
found it unconstitutional (on germaneness grounds) from the nongermane portion
of the bill, meaning article 1, the DNR natural resources provisions. Although
not mentioning article 3 by numerical name, we can only conclude the district
court deemed article 3 part of the PPA for the purpose of its analysis. We will
not assume the absurd result that the district court found article 2, the handgun
carry portion, to be not germane to article 1, the DNR portion of the bill,
but then went on to find article 3, the amendment to the PPA prohibiting the
possession of firearms by certain felons, to be germane to article 1, the DNR
provisions. It cannot be said that article 3 is germane to article 1 after a
finding that article 2 is not.
We agree with the district court’s determination that severance was appropriate.
Associated Builders recommends preserving as much of a law as possible out of
deference to the Minnesota Legislature. That the district court did.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to sever the PPA
(articles 2 and 3) from chapter 28 and, thus, bring 2003 Minn. Laws. ch. 28
into constitutional compliance with Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17.
II. Freedom of Conscience
Appellant next argues that the district court’s comments addressing whether
the PPA violates the Freedom of Conscience clause, Art. I, § 16, of the
Minnesota Constitution are unreviewable dicta. Respondents agree with appellant
that the district court’s comments are dicta and do not require an analysis.
As such, respondents chose not to respond to appellant’s position that
the dicta was not a correct expression of existing law.
Both appellant and respondents agree the district court did not rule that the
PPA violated the Freedom of Conscience clause. The district court explained
that it merely “[made] comment regarding [the conscience clause issue]
to provide guidance to the Appellate Courts.” The district court opined
that if it were to reach the issue, it would likely find the PPA unconstitutional
on this ground also.
The district court found that, “The plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs
are unquestionably sincere in their [religious] beliefs.” The district
court further stated that, “There is no question that the Act infringes
upon those beliefs as it relates to the use of their properties,” and
noted that, “The State . . . has not identified a compelling interest,
which necessitates the infringement upon plaintiffs’ and intervening plaintiffs’
sincere beliefs.”
We recognize, as the district court did, that four of the respondents have raised
a serious challenge to the PPA based on the Freedom of Conscience clause. All
four religious institutions have either explicitly banned guns from their premises
on religious grounds or operate with a general understanding that weapons are
banned from the premises to further principles of non-violence and peace.
Respondents argued below that the PPA infringes on their sincerely held beliefs
by mandating that handgun carriers be allowed to bring a gun into the church
unless the church posts conspicuous signs and verbally confronts their armed
guests. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subds. 17(a), (b), (f) (Supp. 2003).
Respondents also challenged portions of the PPA that disallow the churches from
banning firearms in their parking lots, Id., subd. 17(c) (Supp. 2003), prohibiting
persons who lease space from the church and their guests from carrying firearms,
Id., subd. 17(e) (Supp. 2003), and prohibiting employees from carrying firearms
in parking areas, Id., subd. 18(a)-(c) (Supp. 2003). Respondents argued that
these particular provisions impermissibly infringed on the free exercise of
their sincerely held religious beliefs of peace and non-violence.
We agree with the district court that respondents’ arguments were squarely
presented at the district court level. However, because we affirm the district
court on the Minn. Const. art IV, § 17 issue, we decline to discuss respondents’
religious arguments on an advisory basis. See State v. Hickman, 666 N.W.2d 729,
733 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that a party is not entitled to appellate review
of an advisory opinion of the district court). There are other courts and other
days.
D E C I S I O N
The district court properly held that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject
requirement of the Minnesota Constitution, art. IV, § 17.
The district court properly severed the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal
Protection Act of 2003, chapter 28, to protect the remainder. We hold that both
articles 2 and 3 of chapter 28 must be severed to bring chapter 28 into constitutional
compliance.
Affirmed.
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